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Artificial Islands in the South China Sea 
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ABSTRACT: 
The purpose of this study was to understand the value and implications of artificial islands constructed by 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea. Qualitative analysis was used with the 
available literature, sources, and treaties of the topics concerned. The paper concludes that the PRC gains 
many benefits primarily within the realm of energy security and explores what effects they may 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Artificial islands in the South China Sea 
help the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
bolster their energy security, national security, 
and territorial claims. The Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea are one of the most contested 
regions in the world because of the energy, 
international trade, and strategic concerns of the 
countries involved. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 The South China Sea is located southeast 
of mainland China (Hossain, 2013). It is bounded 
by Vietnam to the west, Taiwan to the north east, 
the Philippines to the east, and Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Brunei to the south. Also to the 
south are the straits of Malacca, Sundra, and 
Lombok. Within the South China Sea are many 
islands. At least three island groups, the Spratly 
Islands, the Paracels, and Scarborough Shoal, are 
of geopolitical significance. 
 The Spratly Islands are one of several 
island groups in the South China Sea. They are 
composed of several hundred small islands and 
reefs. The exact number is difficult to determine. 
Some sources say about 100, while others say 
about 600. The majority of features in the Spratly 
Islands are reefs which are submerged at high 
tide. 
 The United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants each nation an 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical 
miles from their shore or up to 350 nautical miles 
of the continental shelf. With the exception of 
Taiwan, all of the countries with claims in the 
South China Sea have ratified UNCLOS. 
However, many nations in the region claim 
sovereignty over islands and reefs within the EEZ 
of other nations. For example, Brunei's EEZ 
covers Louisa Reef, part of the Spratly Islands. 
However, Louisa Reef is claimed by Malaysia as 
part of its territory.   
 Rigorous geological surveys are required 
to solve such territorial disputes, but they are 
often lacking. An important feature of UNCLOS 
is that land features that are underwater at high 
tide cannot be considered for determining 
territorial waters. A possible interpretation is that 
if 99% of a reef is underwater at high tide, but a 
small part manages to stay above water even 
during the highest tide of the year, then it could 
be considered an island. If so, then it could be 
claimed as sovereign territory and be used to 
establish territorial waters and an EEZ. 
Therefore, aerial or satellite imagery is often 
insufficient and geological surveys that were 
performed during the highest tide of the year are 
required. However, detailed surveys to determine 
if any part is above sea level at high tide are often 
unavailable. 
 The South China Sea and the islands 
within are some of the most contested areas in the 
world.  Almost every country bordering the South 
China Sea has competing territorial claims in the 
region, with the PRC's being one of the largest. 
The PRC's claim is known as the 'U-shaped line' 
and covers almost the entirety of the South China 
Sea, well beyond 200 nautical miles from China's 
1
Holmes: Artificial Islands in the South China Sea
Published by CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2016
www.osr.csusb.edu                                   VOLUME IV, Spring 2016           7 
 
southern shores. While this claim seems to be in 
contradiction to UNCLOS, the PRC is making a 
claim by historic title. Article 15 of UNCLOS 
makes mention of “historic title” but does not go 
into detail. 
The possibility for oil and shipping 
routes are two primary motivations for the 
contention in the South China Sea. Many 
countries in and around the South China Sea are 
increasing the amount of oil they are importing 
owing to rising energy demand. In the 1990s, the 
region's oil output plateaued and since then the 
region has become a net importer of oil.  Current 
reserves of oil, approximately 13 billion barrels, 
would sustain the current demand for only 
fourteen years. Access to untapped oil deposits 
beneath the South China Sea is a key aspect of the 
countries’ competing claims. Unfortunately, the 
untapped resources would not be enough to meet 
demands for the region, but only offset or delay 
the need for additional imports. With rising 
energy demand, and regional reserves becoming 
depleted, securing shipping routes for energy 
become increasingly vital to the strategic interests 
of countries in the region. 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF ARTIFICIAL 
ISLANDS 
 As of May 2015, there are seven artificial 
islands created by the PRC. The seven artificial 
islands were created on Cuarteron Reef, Fiery 
Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson 
Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Land 
reclamation began in summer of 2014 for six of 
the artificial islands. Land reclamation on 
Mischief Reef began in early 2015, and has been 
the fastest growing of the seven projects. 
Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef are the 
largest at over 900,000 square meters each. Many 
of the artificial islands have various support 
facilities and equipment such as radar, 
communication, surveillance, helipads, defensive 
towers, and anti-aircraft guns. Fiery Cross Reef 
even has a 3,000 meter runway and there may be 
a second one on Subi Reef. The New York Times 
reported two mobile artillery vehicles on one of 
the islands, but did not identify which island. 
 The artificial islands created by the PRC 
are most likely calcareous sand dredged up from 
the ocean floor near the island and compacted on 
top of the island. Starting in 2014, the PRC began 
construction of six artificial islands in the Spratly 
Islands, and a seventh in 2015. The islands were 
constructed on contested reefs in the Spratly 
Islands held by China. The artificial islands 
appear to be made from dredged sand. A paper 
written in 2010 by a group of Chinese engineers 
examines the engineering aspects of calcareous 
sand. (Calcareous sand comes from old coral and 
shells. It is very common on and around the reefs 
of the Spratly Islands.) They specifically looked 
at Fiery Cross Reef, one of the most developed 
artificial islands to date. From their research, they 
determined that traditional pile driving was 
ineffective in calcareous sand. Through 
experimentation, they discovered the most stable 
method to support structures with calcareous sand 
were square plates on top of compacted, dry sand. 
 The PRC's stated reason for the creation 
of artificial islands and the facilities on them are 
to provide services to civilian ships in the South 
China Sea. In April 2015, Ambassador Cui 
Tiankai, stated that the purposes of the artificial 
islands are mainly to provide shelter for ships, 
navigation aid, search and rescue, weather 
observation, and others. He also stated, “Of 
course there will be defense facilities. This is only 
natural and necessary and they are purely for 
defensive purposes.” 
 
BENEFITS OF ARTICIFICAL ISLANDS 
 The PRC built the artificial islands to 
bolster energy security, national security, and 
territorial claims. Artificial islands allow the 
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to 
station supplies and equipment in the South 
China Sea to better protect oil shipments and to 
defend the mainland. Also, artificial islands 
cannot be used to make territorial claims, but they 
can be used to make existing territorial claims 
difficult to dispute. 
 Artificial islands in the South China Sea 
also help promote Chinese national security by 
protecting their energy security. Energy security 
is a major issue in the PRC and is invariably 
linked with national security. Since 1993, the 
PRC has been an oil importing nation. In 2011, 
approximately 54.8% of the PRC's oil 
consumption was imported. Approximately 75% 
of imported oil (or about 40% of total consumed 
oil) is shipped through the Strait of Malacca and 
the South China Sea. Therefore, whoever controls 
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the Strait of Malacca, or can block it, can threaten 
the PRC's oil supply. The “Malacca Dilemma” as 
it is called in the PRC, may be one of the 
motivations behind building the artificial islands 
in the South China Sea.  The 3,000 meter runway 
on Fiery Cross Reef allows almost any PRC 
airplane to land on the island. Because of this 
runway, the PRC now has refueling and supply 
capabilities to reach the southern end of the South 
China Sea. Therefore, the artificial islands give 
the PRC the capability to strike against anyone 
who threatens the Strait of Malacca. 
 In addition to strengthening energy 
security, the PRC is adding another ring of 
security to protect the mainland. Historically, 
China promoted national security by establishing 
buffer zones around central areas of national 
interest. From 1840 to 1945, Chinese security and 
sovereignty were compromised by its lack of 
maritime power. Building supply and support 
facilities on the artificial islands allows PLAN to 
fight further away from the PRC mainland. By 
extending their capabilities over the South China 
Sea, the PRC has enhanced security for the 
mainland. 
 The artificial islands cannot be used to 
make new territorial claims but instead strengthen 
existing Chinese claims in the South China Sea. 
Like reefs that are under water at high tide, 
artificial islands cannot be used to determine 
territorial waters or an EEZ under UNCLOS. At 
most, they are only allowed a 500 meter safety 
zone. When determining territorial claims, what 
matters is the original status of the reef or island, 
not what it was made into. Piling compacted sand 
onto a reef makes determining the original status 
nearly impossible. Therefore, future disputes 
based on geological surveys would work in the 
PRC's favor by eliminating any evidence against 
them. However, UNCLOS also requires that due 
notice must be given for the construction of 
artificial islands, which China did not do. 
 
IMPLICATIONS-PHILIPPINES  
 The Philippines is likely to continue 
searching for outside help to regain territorial 
claims. The Philippines have the most to lose. 
Losing access to resources in the South China Sea 
could damage the Filipino economy.  All seven of 
the PRC's artificial islands are within the 
Philippine's claimed territory, and Mischief Reef 
is within the Philippine's 200 nautical mile EEZ. 
The Philippines has one of the weakest militaries 
in the region and does not have the resources to 
challenge the PRC directly. As an example of 
their weak military strength, the Philippine Navy 
grounded a WWII era ship, the Sierra Madre, into 
Second Thomas Shoal to serve as shelter for 
garrison troops. Without a strong military to 
counter the PRC, the Philippines will have to 
search for outside help. 
 The Philippines are likely to continue to 
seek resolution through legal channels, but with 
little to no success. In 2013, The Philippines 
attempted to resolve territorial disputes with the 
PRC through arbitration at The Hague. The PRC 
declined arbitration. Annex VII, article 9 of 
UNCLOS does not bar proceeding if a party fails 
to show. The Philippines has continued with the 
arbitration but each time the PRC declines. It 
seems likely that the PRC will continue to 
stonewall the Philippine's legal complaints unless 
a stronger force can compel the PRC to cooperate.  
 The Philippines will also continue to seek 
closer ties to the United States. The US and the 
Philippines have been allies since the 1951 
Mutual Defense Treaty. This year, the US sent 
6,000 troops to the Philippines to perform in 
annual joint military exercises with the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This was more 
than twice the number of troops from last year. 
With the US's pivot to Asia, we are likely to see 
more cooperation between the US and the 
Philippines. 
 
IMPLICATIONS-VIETNAM  
 Vietnam is likely to engage in an 
artificial island arms building race with the PRC. 
Land reclamation at sea was actually started by 
Vietnam. However, their construction is much 
smaller in terms of scale and speed compared to 
the PRC's artificial islands. Given the history of 
animosity between the two countries, Vietnam 
may accelerate their land reclamation activities in 
response to the PRC's. 
 The seven artificial islands made by the 
PRC so far are not the only land reclamation 
activities performed in the South China Sea. The 
two islands held by Vietnam, Sand Cay and West 
Reef, have increased in size. Land reclamation on 
Sand Cay island started in 2011 and work on 
West Reef started in 2012. Both predate the land 
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reclamation on any of the PRC islands. However, 
they are much smaller compared to the PRC's 
islands, and land reclamation was performed 
much more slowly. 
 There is a long history of animosity 
between Vietnam and the PRC. In Vietnam's 
2,500 years of history, Vietnam was invaded by 
China (now People's Republic of China) 
seventeen times. In more recent times, the PRC 
invaded the Paracel Islands and took control of 
them from Vietnam in 1974.  The islands are 
currently controlled by the PRC but still claimed 
by Vietnam.  Later in 1988, PRC forces took 
control of Johnson South Reef after killing 
approximately 70 Vietnamese sailors stationed 
on the island. In 2014, the PRC moved the 
Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig into waters near the 
Paracels sparking a standoff between Vietnamese 
and PRC coast guard vessels. PRC ships rammed 
and blasted water at Vietnamese ships. 
 Many of the islands do not offer 
economic value, but have strategic value. The 
Paracels for example, offer almost no economic 
value but instead give the PRC a first strike 
capability against Vietnam by placing airstrips 
and facilities closer to the Vietnam mainland. 
With the enhanced strike capability the islands 
offer, Vietnam may attempt to balance the 
strategic advantage of the PRC's artificial islands 
with islands of their own. 
 
IMPLICATIONS-MALAYSIA & 
INDONESIA  
 The implications of the PRC's artificial 
islands for Malaysia and Indonesia should have 
little effect on territorial claims but would more 
likely affect their energy policies. Territorial 
disputes for both countries are much smaller. 
Malaysia occupies only three islands at the 
southern end of the Spratly Islands, but these 
three islands are claimed by Brunei. Indonesia 
does not claim any of the disputed islands. 
Currently, Indonesia is an oil importer and 
Malaysia is expected to become an oil importer in 
the near future. This may influence Indonesia and 
Malaysia to compete with the PRC for energy, 
shipping routes, and energy security. 
 
IMPLICATIONS-UNITED STATES   
The US is likely to experience more 
brinksmanship from the PRC. By maintaining 
open shipping routes throughout the region, the 
US is supporting its own national security, 
economic access, and political influence. Ninety 
percent of the oil destined for US allies goes 
through the Strait of Malacca and the South China 
Sea. However, the PRC believes that the US is 
attempting to expand its hegemonic influence in 
the region and to keep the PRC out. Because of 
the competing interests of the US and the PRC, 
we are likely to see more incidents like the 
Cowpens incident. On 5 December 2013, a 
PLAN ship deliberately crossed the path of the 
USS Cowpens. The USS Cowpens was forced to 
maneuver to avoid colliding with the PLAN ship. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 The seven artificial islands built by the 
PRC help protect their energy security, national 
security, and territorial claims in the South China 
Sea. The islands give the PRC the capability to 
project power throughout the region, protect oil 
shipments and create a buffer for the mainland. 
They also reinforce existing territorial claims by 
making precise scientific measurements of the 
original features impossible. These islands also 
have ramifications for the US and other countries 
in the region, in terms of security, energy, and 
territorial claims. 
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